Multi-vendor VPN Troubleshooting : Study of IPsec VPN Troubleshooting in a multi-vendor environment by Lundell, Tommi
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tommi Lundell 
 
Multi-vendor VPN Troubleshooting 
 
Study of IPsec VPN Troubleshooting in a multi-vendor environment 
Helsinki Metropolia University of Applied Sciences 
Bachelor of Engineering 
Information Technology 
Thesis 
9 May 2017 
 
 Abstract 
 
 
Author 
Title 
 
Number of Pages 
Date 
Tommi Lundell 
Multi-vendor VPN Troubleshooting 
 
57 pages + 2 appendices  
9.5.2017 
Degree Bachelor of Engineering 
Degree Programme Information Technology 
Specialisation option Networking 
Instructor 
 
Marko Uusitalo, Senior Lecturer 
With the vast reliance on the Internet, corporations end up managing not only their intranet 
but extranets as well to allow resource sharing with their partner corporations. In order to 
connect users or sites to these intra- and extranets over various internets, VPN tunnels are 
typically constructed to create such a logical connection over physical infrastructure. In 
such environments different networking devices are found with varying degrees of support 
for vendor interoperability. This will set constraints and considerations to the VPN tunnel 
creation as well in multivendor environments. 
 
This study was fueled by the desire to explore differences in VPN tunnel building and trou-
bleshooting processes between two devices designed by different vendors. As such this 
project aims to construct an IPsec site-to-site VPN tunnel between two such gateways and 
systematically introduce issues to the connection for troubleshooting analysis. The results 
then would be compiled into a guide to aid future troubleshooting. Additionally, any differ-
ences and similarities in the devices’ protocol handling will be documented. 
 
The available hardware for the project was Cisco’s ASA 5505 and Palo Alto Networks’ PA-
200 security gateways. The physical network setup was done in the campus’ laboratory 
environment the third-party network included. 
 
The experimentation results were fruitful, providing two points of view to the protocol ex-
changes. While the standardized protocols guided the negotiations along a certain path, 
the debugging output certainly differed between the vendors; Palo Alto focused more on 
printing out each stage transitioning, while Cisco was more focused on user-friendliness. 
 
In the future when site-to-site IPsec VPNs are implemented, corporations could be seen 
gradually switching to IKEv2 protocol as the latest stable software versions have confirmed 
the support. As the authentication method is more of a question of scalability, both PSK 
and Certificate- based methods will certainly remain in use. Other than the upgrade of se-
curity levels, future studies will more often implement support for IPv6 tunnelling parallel to 
IPv4. 
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Internetistä on kasvanut niin suuri tekijä yrityksille, että intranetin lisäksi ekstranetien 
hallinnointi tulee olla huomioitu resurssienjakoa varten. Etäkäyttäjien ja toimipisteiden 
yhteenliittämiseksi julkisien verkkojen kautta, VPN-tunneleita yleisesti käytetään näiden 
loogisien yhteyksien muodostamisessa. Tällaisissä ympäristöissä tulee vastaan monien eri 
laitevalmistajien laitteita, jotka vaihtelevissa määrin ovat yhteensopivia. Eri laitevalmistajien 
laitteiden tukeminen vaatii tiettyjen ominaisuuksien huomioimista VPN-tunneleidenkin 
kohdalla. 
 
Insinöörityön taustalla oli kiinnostus tutkia, kuinka VPN-tunnelien rakentaminen ja 
vianselvitys eroavat eri laitevalmistajien laitteiden välillä. Työssä rakennettiin kuviteltujen 
toimipisteiden välille VPN-tunneli, jota systemaattisesti koeteltiin eri ennaltamääritellyillä 
ongelmatilanteilla. Nämä ongelmatilanteet puolestaan dokumentoitiin analyysia varten, ja 
niiden pohjalta tehtiin kooste olennaisista viesteistä, jotka osoittivat vikojen alkuperät. 
Lisäksi laitteiden protokollien soveltamista tarkkailtiin ja vertailtiin. 
 
Työssä käytettiin Ciscon ASA 5505- ja Palo Alto Networksin PA-200-palomuureja. 
Käytännön työ suoritettiin ammattikorkeakoulun kampuksen laboratorioympäristössä 
kokonaisuudessaan. 
 
Testitulokset olivat värikkäitä ja ilmaisivat keskustelun kahdesta selvästi eri näkökulmasta, 
vaikka protokollien standardit ohjasivatkin protokollaneuvottelujen etenemistä. Palo Alton 
PA-200 kuvaili tarkemmin keskustelun vaiheet ja taustaoperaatiot, kun taas Ciscon ASA 
5505 keskittyi käyttäjäystävällisyyteen ja luettavuuteen. 
 
Tulevaisuudessa tällaisissa implementaatioissa siirrytään varmasti IKEv2-protokollan 
käyttöön sitä mukaa, kun käyttöjärjestelmät sitä laajemmin tukevat. 
Sertifikaattiautentikoinnin käyttö lisääntyy ekstranetien lisääntyessä, mutta PSK-
autentikointimenetelmä pysynee pienempien yrityksen käytössä. IPv6-protokollan 
käyttöönotto ja tuki lisääntyy myös jatkuvasti – VPN-tunneleiden osalla erityisesti. 
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1 Introduction 
 
This paper aims to serve as a guide for troubleshooting Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
issues between two networking devices: Cisco’s ASA 5505 and Palo Alto Networks’ 
PA-200. In this study a Site-to-Site VPN connection is set up using the Internet Proto-
col Security (IPsec) protocol suite. 
 
Starting with the theory section the concept of VPN and the IPsec protocol suite is pre-
sented and the structure of the necessary modifications to Internet Protocol (IP) pack-
ets covered. Next the devices and vendors are briefly introduced following step-by-step 
device configurations. Once the VPN tunnels have been established, problem situa-
tions are introduced to the VPN connectivity via systematic misconfigurations. These 
issues are documented and identified from both devices’ perspectives via various 
methods introduced by their respective vendors. After the issues have been identified, 
a summary is drawn in conclusion to report the findings. 
 
The motivation for the study comes from having worked in a multi-vendor environment 
where access to only one tunnel endpoint is available. In order to save time and be 
able to draw conclusions with proof to show in such cases, I chose this topic. 
 
While this study covers Site-to-Site IPsec VPN connectivity troubleshooting methods, it 
is limited to the devices Cisco’s ASA 5505 and Palo Alto Networks’ PA-200. Changes 
in software versions and peering with any other network devices are likely to introduce 
issues not covered by this troubleshooting guide. 
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2 Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) 
 
The Internet, being a composite of various devices and mediums in-between, is typical-
ly treated as an obscure, virtual cloud. The ownership of the Internet is divided between 
numerous Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and other organizations each responsible 
for their own infrastructure as part of the Internet. End-users utilizing their ISP’s ser-
vices trust that they receive connectivity to all resources connected to the Internet. 
However, in case of confidential data a layer of security should be added to the data 
travelling across the Internet. Here we introduce the concept of VPN. 
 
The purpose of a VPN, as its name implies, is the creation of a virtual private network 
connection also called a VPN tunnel. The VPN tunnel establishes a logical connection 
between two endpoints over a third-party network, such as the Internet, for security and 
management purposes. As a security measure data can be delivered over third-party 
networks encrypted and then authenticated and integrity checked at the end of the tun-
nel. For management purposes the whole third-party infrastructure can be viewed as a 
flexible pipe spanning from one end to another without caring what there is physically 
in-between. 
 
2.1 Site-to-Site VPN 
 
VPN types are commonly divided into Site-to-Site and Remote Access VPNs. A Site-to-
Site VPN is established between two gateways connecting for instance a branch site’s 
network to the headquarters’ network. A Remote Access VPN on the other hand con-
nects a host to a remote gateway for instance a telecommuter to corporate site. A less 
commonly known third type, host-to-host, also exists, though it can be classified as a 
restricted Remote Access VPN [1, 245–250]. This study uses Site-to-Site VPN to con-
nect two sites together, allowing their private networks to communicate securely. 
 
2.2 IPsec VPN 
 
IPsec is what commonly provides VPNs with the security they are known for – at least 
in Site-to-Site implementations. IPsec is a protocol suite operating on the Network lay-
er, thus it complements VPN well when transmitting data between trusted networks 
over an untrusted network. [2, 256–257].  
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3 Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
 
Rather than being an actual tunnelling protocol, IPsec, defined by Internet Engineering 
Task Force’s (IETF) RFC6071 document among others, is a modular collection of pro-
tocols to provide VPN tunnelling with data confidentiality, message integrity, data origin 
authentication and anti-replay protection [3, 3]. IPsec’s ability to support various open 
standards also allows for vendor interoperability [2, 256]. 
 
The IPsec framework comprises two main protocols: Authentication Header (AH) and 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). These two are responsible for providing the 
security services of the IPsec framework. Figure 1 below breaks the framework down 
and presents its components. 
 
 
Figure 1. IPsec Framework overview (modified) [4]. 
 
In IPsec VPNs IP packets can be encapsulated either using Authentication Header 
(AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). The primary difference between the two 
is that AH does not encrypt the IP packets and thus does not provide data confidentiali-
ty [2, 261]. Both AH and ESP can be used together, but such practical examples are 
non-existent. Nowadays ESP is the standard choice.  
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The confidentiality of  data is guaranteed via cryptography; the contents of IP packets 
are encrypted before entering the tunnel and then decrypted at the end of the tunnel. In 
the encrypted form the otherwise plaintext data is temporarily transformed into unread-
able format, so the packet’s contents could not be deciphered even if captured in 
transmit over a third-party network. For the process of encryption and decryption a 
symmetric encryption algorithm is chosen according to the level of security required. 
The strength of standardized encryption algorithms can be generally estimated by the 
length of the keys (in bits) used in the algorithm’s computations; the longer the more 
secure against brute-force attacks. The most common encryption algorithms as pic-
tured in Figure 1 are as follows: 
 Digital Encryption Standard (DES) 
 Triple Digital Encryption Standard (3DES)  
 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). [2, 256–267.] 
 
The data integrity ensures that data does not get lost or modified in transmit. This is 
done by taking a packet’s content and running it through a cryptographic hash function. 
This will result in a theoretically unique, irreversible and compressed bit stream known 
as a hash. The hash generated at tunnel’s transmitting end is concatenated to the 
packet to be used at the receiving end in verifying the packet’s integrity; if the hash 
included in the packet matches with the hash generated at the receiving end the con-
tents can be verified to be unharmed. Cryptographic hash functions as shown in Figure 
1 include: 
 Message Digest 5 (MD5) 
 Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). [2, 256–259.] 
 
Additionally utilizing Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) with the chosen 
hash function, the message authenticity  can be verified along with its integrity as a 
shared secret is used in producing the hash [5, 1–2]. Implemented together with a cryp-
tographic hash function such as SHA-1 results in a variant called HMAC-SHA-1 [6]. 
 
VPN peer authentication ensures that the VPN tunnel is established between the right 
devices and is thus an essential step in forming VPN connectivity. The primary meth-
ods are usage of Pre-Shared Key (PSK), RSA signatures and RSA-encrypted nonces. 
PSKs are manually configured and shared between the engineers responsible for the 
VPN peers over a different communication channel. RSA signatures are digital certifi-
cates signed by a trusted, third-party Certificate Authority (CA). RSA-encrypted nonces 
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utilize public key cryptography making it more complex than PSK. RSA-encrypted 
nonces as an authentication method is also limited to the Cisco Internetwork Operating 
System (IOS) software. While RSA signatures possess superior scalability over PSKs 
due to saving the trouble of configuring it separately for each individual peer, this study 
will use the more easily deployed PSK as the peer authentication method. 
 
Finally the Diffie-Hellman (DH) group selection will determine the security level of the 
secure key exchange. DH, being a public-key cryptography protocol, allows the secure 
generation of shared secret keys for encryption algorithms over third-party networks. 
The higher the DH group number the more secure it is against brute-force attacks. 
 
3.1 IPsec Modes 
 
IPsec can operate either in Transport mode or Tunnel mode. The Transport mode pro-
tects packets up to the Transport layer and the Tunnel mode protects up to the Net-
work layer. 
 
In the Transport mode IPsec places the header (AH, ESP or AH+ESP) between the 
original IP header and the IP payload (data). This will leave the original IP header ex-
posed to traffic analysis when transmitted over public networks. [7, 457–459.] 
 
In the Tunnel mode the IPsec header (AH, ESP or AH+ESP) encapsulates both the 
original IP header and IP payload. Additionally a new IP header is created on top of the 
IPsec header. This new IP header specifies the VPN peers as the source and destina-
tion addresses, thus concealing the actual message sender and recipient. While the 
Tunnel mode increases the packet overhead, it provides additional security. [7, 457–
459.] 
 
3.2 IPsec Security Protocols 
 
In practice IPsec security services are applied to traffic via AH and/or ESP header en-
capsulation. The AH and ESP headers contain the information necessary to validate 
the IPsec Security Association (SA) and the data within. These headers are not applied 
to IKE/IPsec negotiation exchanges and only for the data to be secured once the IKE 
and IPsec SAs have been established. 
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AH is an IPsec security protocol with the following features: 
 data integrity 
 data origin authentication 
 anti-replay protection. 
Figure 2 below displays the fields within an AH header. 
 
 
Figure 2. IPsec AH format [7, 465]. 
 
The Next Header field contains the protocol number of the next header such as 4 for 
IPv4 header. The Payload length specifies the length of the AH without the following 
payload. The Reserved functions as padding and is set to zero. The Security Parame-
ter Index (SPI), combined with destination address and protocol type, acts as an identi-
fier for IPsec SAs – receiver should have a matching inbound SA. Sequence Number is 
a running number used to protect against replay attacks by preventing retransmission. 
Integrity Check Value (ICV) is a signed hash which the recipient uses to verify data 
integrity and to authenticate the sender. [7, 465.] 
 
ESP as the other IPsec security protocol provides the following features: 
 data confidentiality 
 data integrity 
 data origin authentication 
 anti-replay protection. 
Figure 3 below displays the fields within an ESP header. 
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Figure 3. IPsec ESP format [7, 471; 8, 4]. 
 
Compared to AH and it’s distinct header, ESP is scattered around the payload due to 
the encryption scheme. ESP header comprises SPI and Sequence Number fields act-
ing as IPsec SA identifier and anti-replay protection just as with AH header. Following 
ESP header is ESP Payload, the encrypted data. Following the ESP Payload is ESP 
Trailer which contains Padding, Pad Length and Next Header. ESP Trailer is encrypted 
along with ESP Payload and provides necessary padding to adjust the input for the 
encryption algorithm. Next Header field in IPsec Tunnel mode has the number 4 for IP 
Header inside the ESP Payload. Finally, like AH, ESP contains an ICV, ESP Authenti-
cation Data, to verify data integrity and authenticate the sender. [7, 466–470.] 
 
Figure 4 portraits the AH and ESP encapsulations for both Transport and Tunnel mode. 
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Figure 4. IPsec encapsulation in Transport and Tunnel mode (modified) [2, 261; 8, 17–19.] 
 
As shown in Figure 4 Transport mode leaves the original IP header exposed, whereas 
Tunnel mode encapsulates it inside AH or ESP header and creates a new header for 
transmission until tunnel endpoint. Figure 4 also highlights which headers are included 
in ESP’s encryption and authentication (ICV). It is noteworthy to point out that AH addi-
tionally includes the IP header preceding the AH header to its ICV computation. As a 
result AH requires that the topmost IP header remains immutable during transmit. [8, 
17–19]. This renders Network Address Translation (NAT) as well as IPsec’s optional 
feature Network Address Translation-Traversal (NAT-T) impossible to combine with 
AH. Also, the ESP header does not specify Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) / User 
Datagram Protocol (UDP) header information. This is only inside the inner, encapsulat-
ed IP header. In case NAT-T is enabled and discovered during IKE Phase 1 MM mes-
sages 3–4, a new UDP header will precede the ESP header with UDP port 4500 as the 
source and destination port. 
 
3.3 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
 
Internet Key Exchange (IKE) is the protocol responsible for the policy negotiations be-
tween peers and establishment of Security Associations (SA) in the IPsec framework. 
IKE is in fact a hybrid protocol utilizing the functions of three protocols: 
 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) 
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 Oakley 
 SKEME. [9, 2–3.] 
 
ISAKMP provides IKE with the framework for SA negotiation, establishment, updating 
and termination. Oakley is a key determination protocol and manages the key ex-
changes using a DH algorithm. Oakley can also provide Perfect Forward Secrecy 
(PFS) for keys and peer identities. Similar to Oakley, SKEME defines public key en-
cryption methods for authenticated key exchange and swift re-keying via nonce ex-
change. [9, 2–3.] 
 
IKE currently has two different implementations: IKE version 1 (IKEv1) and IKE version 
2 (IKEv2). IKEv2, being the successor for IKEv1, runs most of the same features as 
IKEv1 does with improved stability, more efficient exchanges and various other im-
provements. [10, 135–136]. However, as not nearly all networking devices yet fully 
support IKEv2, IKEv1 is still widely implemented. This study will only cover configura-
tion steps for IKEv1. 
 
IKE negotiations are divided into two phases: Phase 1 and Phase 2. IKE Phase 1 ne-
gotiates IKE policies, performs DH key exchange and peer authentication in order to 
establish a bidirectional IKE SA – also known as ISAKMP SA. IKE Phase 2, utilizing 
the existing IKE SA, negotiates IPsec security parameters for tunnelled traffic and es-
tablishes a pair of unidirectional IPsec SAs. [2, 284–288.] An optional IKE Phase 1.5 
also exists to provide user authentication via Extended Authentication (Xauth) [2, 263–
266]. 
 
IKE Phase 1 can operate in two modes: Main Mode (MM) and Aggressive Mode (AM). 
Both MM and AM perform the same tasks; MM does this in 6 messages while AM in 3 
messages. MM stages are as follows: 
1. The Initiator sends the receiver its IKE policy sets as proposals 
2. Receiver compares the policy sets to its own and sends the agreed policy set 
back 
3. Initiator sends its DH public key and nonce to initiate DH key exchange 
4. Receiver sends its DH public key and nonce completing DH key exchange 
 With the exchanged keys, they both compute a shared secret 
5. Initiator sends its identity payload encrypted and hashed 
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6. Receiver decrypts and validates the hashed identity payload in order to authen-
ticate the peer then sends its identity payload encrypted and hashed in return. 
In comparison AM stages are as follows: 
1. Initiator sends its IKE policy set proposal, DH key materials and identity payload 
2. Receiver replies with the selected IKE policy set, its own DH key materials and 
identity payload with authentication hash for Initiator to authenticate. 
3. Initiator sends its encrypted authentication hash for receiver to authenticate. 
While AM employs more efficiency in its exchanges, it does not provide protection for 
identity payload and receiver has to agree on initiator’s DH group selection. [9, 7–15.] 
 
IKE Phase 2 utilizes the established IKE SA applying the negotiated security parame-
ters to protect its exchanges via encryption and authentication. IKE Phase 2 operation 
mode is called Quick Mode (QM). QM exchanges the following three messages: 
1. Initiator sends the IPsec policy set proposal, a nonce and a hash payload 
 If PFS is enabled, new DH key materials are exchanged for IPsec SAs 
2. Receiver sends the agreed IPsec policy set, its own nonce and a hash payload 
 If PFS is enabled, new DH key materials are exchanged for IPsec SAs 
3. Initiator sends a hash payload generated with the nonces completing the ex-
change [9, 17.] 
 
3.4 Security Association (SA) 
 
SA represents an established secure connection between two parties. When an SA is 
active, the agreed security parameters are applied to the exchanges. IKE SA, as estab-
lished during IKE Phase 1, acts as a bidirectional control channel for management of 
IPsec SAs. IPsec SA, as established during IKE Phase 2, is a unidirectional data chan-
nel, thus two IPsec SAs are required for inbound and outbound trafficking between two 
tunnelled networks. Should VPN peers negotiate multiple networks to be allowed pass 
through the VPN, an IPsec SA pair will be generated for each pair. [7, 460–461.] 
 
SA information is stored in a Security Association Database (SAD). SAD records Des-
tination IP address, SPI number and IPsec security protocol number for each SA. All 
three pieces of information are present in IPsec-encapsulated packets to identify which 
SA the packet belongs to. Among the negotiated security parameters is SA lifetime, 
which is tracked by each peer to determine when the SA is to be terminated and new 
one(s) established. [2, 291–292.] 
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4 Device Setup 
 
For the study two firewalls capable of acting as gateways for a small to mid-size site 
were chosen. Among the feature requirements were support for IPsec Site-to-Site VPN 
and IPv6 deployment. The devices chosen were Palo Alto Networks’ PA-200 and Cis-
co’s Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 5505. The two are the most affordable models 
among their series of firewalls. 
 
4.1 Palo Alto Networks PA-200 
 
Palo Alto Networks’ PA-200 is a next-generation security appliance running Palo Alto’s 
PAN-OS operating system. The device comes with a 4-port Ethernet switch supporting 
Layer 3, Layer 2 and transparent Virtual-wire interface modes as well as separate 
management, console and USB ports. PA-200 is capable of applying security policies 
not only based on the IP address, zone, port or protocol but also based on User-ID, 
App-ID and Content-ID. In addition, the firewall provides Intrusion Prevention System 
(IPS) engine for traffic scanning, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) and IPsec VPN tunnel-
ling and virtualization of system or routing instances for scalability. [11.] 
 
PA-200 of Palo Alto Networks has the following management interfaces: 
 Web-based Graphical User Interface (GUI) over Hypertext Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) or HTTP Secure (HTTPS) via an Ethernet port 
 Command Line Interface (CLI) either over Telnet or Secure Shell (SSH) via an 
Ethernet port or via the console port 
 Extensive Markup Language (XML) based Application Programming Interface 
(API) over HTTPS via an Ethernet port. [11]. 
 
For initial configuration either the console port or the pre-configured Management port 
(MGT) should be used. This study will handle device configurations via GUI and use 
both GUI and CLI for troubleshooting. The Web-based GUI is illustrated in Figure 5 
below. 
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Figure 5. PA-200 Web GUI Dashboard 
 
The PA-200 Web GUI contains the following tabs: 
 Dashboard 
 Application Command Center (ACC) 
 Monitor 
 Policies 
 Objects 
 Network 
 Device. 
 
The Dashboard contains selectable widgets to display the overall operating status and 
recent events of the device. The ACC constructs illustrious application usage, Uniform 
Resource Locator (URL) filtering, data filtering and threat prevention statistics based on 
traffic logs. The Monitor allows the viewing and filtering of traffic, threat, URL, data, 
configuration, system and alarm logs. Monitor also allows packet capture and reporting. 
Policies section enforces the firewall’s security policies, NAT rules, Policy-Based For-
warding (PBF) and Quality of Service (QoS) policies. Objects tab contains all defini-
tions pertaining to entities or entity groups given custom identifiers to be referenced in 
places such as security policies. Network contains all configurations regarding interfac-
es, virtual routers, routing protocols, zones, Virtual Local Area Networks (VLANs), IP-
sec tunnels, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) and QoS. Finally all device 
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management settings such as access rights, MGT port settings, service routes, log 
management as well as software and content updates are located under the Device 
tab. 
 
4.2 Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) 5505 
 
The Cisco ASA 5505 is a network security appliance running Cisco Systems’ IOS op-
erating system. The device has a built-in 8-port Layer 2 Ethernet switch, requiring logi-
cal VLAN interfaces for Layer 3 connectivity, as well as a console port and two USB 
ports. ASA 5505 integrates a stateful, zone-based firewall with IPsec/SSL VPN concen-
trator and IPS engine. 
 
Cisco ASA 5505 has the following management interfaces: 
 Web-based GUI best known as the Adaptive Security Device Manager (ASDM) 
over HTTP or HTTPS via an Ethernet port 
 CLI either over Telnet or SSH via an Ethernet port or via the console port. 
 
For initial configuration the console port should be used. While the factory default con-
figuration comes with pre-configured VLAN1 and VLAN2 interfaces, we will start with a 
clean start-up configuration. In this case access to the ASDM needs to be explicitly 
configured. To allow an internal host 10.0.2.1, connected to Ethernet0/0 port, access 
the ASDM GUI, the interface, HTTP server service and an access filter need to be con-
figured to allow HTTP/HTTPS requests. Listing 1 below shows how to allow a host to 
access the ASDM. 
 
interface Vlan10 
 nameif trust 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 10.0.2.254 255.255.255.0  
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 switchport access vlan 10 
 no shutdown 
! 
http server enable 
http 10.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 trust 
Listing 1. ASA ASDM Management Configuration. 
 
This study goes through the ASA device configurations via CLI and uses both ASDM 
and CLI for troubleshooting. The ASDM is illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
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Figure 6. ASA 5505 ASDM Device Dashboard 
 
The Device Dashboard under Home view displays general device information, system 
resource and interface statuses, and traffic levels. The adjacent Firewall Dashboard 
draws graphs for session and packet filtering statistics. The Configuration tab allows 
the configuration of interfaces, routing protocols, firewall policies, SSL/IPsec VPNs and 
Management services. The Monitoring tab displays interface statuses, routing tables, 
VPN session details and statistics, and logging data. 
 
The ASDM top panel additionally holds useful features under File, Tools and Wizards 
menus. The File drop-down menu lists configuration management functionalities. Tools 
menu contains troubleshooting functionalities such as Packet Tracer, Ping and Trac-
eroute tools, updating services and even allows usage of CLI via ASDM. Wizards menu 
contains step-by-step setups for device start-up configuration, VPN configuration as 
well as a Packet Capture Wizard for capturing specified traffic passing the ASA firewall. 
 
4.3 Network Topology and Addressing 
 
The network topology comprises the two firewalls, PA-200 and ASA 5505, a router rep-
resenting a third-party hop in-between the firewalls and a host behind each firewall. 
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The firewalls act as the gateway for the two sites allowing the sites’ private networks to 
connect with the use of a VPN. Figure 7 below illustrates the network topology. 
 
 
Figure 7. Network topology diagram. 
 
The site behind PA-200 will have 10.0.1.0/24 as its internal Local Area Network (LAN). 
PA-200 site’s internal host’s Network Interface Card (NIC) is configured with the IPv4 
address 10.0.1.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 and default gateway 10.0.1.254. Similar-
ly the site behind ASA 5505 uses 10.0.2.0/24 as its LAN while the site’s host is config-
ured with IPv4 address 10.0.2.1, subnet mask 255.255.255.0 and default gateway. 
Although third-party networks, the public network facing interfaces on PA-200 and ASA 
5505 have 172.16.1.0/30 and 172.16.2.0/30 respectively as their upstream networks. 
All device connections use standard Ethernet cables (RJ-45). Table 1 presents the 
whole IP addressing scheme. 
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Table 1. IP Addressing scheme 
 
Device Interface IPv4 Address Default Gateway
Ethernet1/1 10.0.1.254/24 N/A
Ethernet1/2 172.16.1.1/30 172.16.1.2
Ethernet0/0 10.0.2.254/24 N/A
Ethernet0/1 172.16.2.1/30 172.16.2.2
Ethernet0/0 172.16.1.2/30 N/A
Ethernet0/1 172.16.2.2/30 N/A
Loopback0 172.16.3.1/24 N/A
PC1 Ethernet 10.0.1.1/24 10.0.1.254
PC2 Ethernet 10.0.2.1/24 10.0.2.254
IP Addressing Table
PA-200
ASA5505
Router
 
 
In addition to the topology view in Figure 7, the router will get its Loopback0 interface 
configured when NAT-T is covered later in the Experimenting and Troubleshooting sec-
tion. This will give the router a distinct pool of addresses for NAT. 
 
 
5 Device Configuration 
 
This section will cover the steps and commands required to configure the devices in 
the topology. The host computers are configured with static IPv4 addresses and default 
gateways according to Table 1. The third-party router only has its interfaces configured, 
thus only routing between its directly connected networks 172.16.1.0/30 and 
172.16.2.0/30. 
 
The configuration steps or commands may vary with different software versions. The 
software versions used in this study are as follows: 
 PA-200 software version 6.1.4 
 ASA 5505 software version 9.2(4) 
 ASA 5505 ASDM version 7.4(3). 
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5.1 Configuring PA-200 
 
In the case of PA-200 the GUI is recommended over CLI when applying configurations. 
As the configuration file is structured in a hierarchical manner, dependencies caused 
by virtual routers and virtual systems can be confusing. GUI covers the required de-
pendencies to alleviate confusion. In case all necessary dependencies are not handled 
before committing the configuration changes, the commit prompt will issue a warning. 
 
Before beginning, due to choosing a Layer 3 deployment, the default virtual-wire con-
figuration should be purged as the Ethernet1/1 and Ethernet1/2 interfaces are initially 
bound and allow traffic pass the PA-200 firewall transparently without switching or rout-
ing. Via CLI we execute the following commands under the configuration mode as 
shown in Listing 2 below. 
 
delete network virtual-wire default-vwire 
delete zone trust 
delete zone untrust 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/2 layer3 
Listing 2. Preparing PA-200 for Layer 3 deployment. 
 
While the MGT port can be used access the GUI with its default settings, in this study 
the internal LAN interface will be configured to allow access to the device GUI as 
shown in Listing 3 below. 
 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT https yes 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT ssh yes 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT ping yes 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ip 10.0.1.254/24 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 interface-
management-profile MGMT  
Listing 3. PA-200 GUI management configuration. 
 
With management access allowed through the data port Ethernet1/1, the host config-
ured with IPv4 address 10.0.1.1/24 and connected to the aforementioned port can now 
access https://10.0.1.254 via its web browser. On the GUI Network tab we will create 
three Layer 3 zones named ‘trust’, ‘untrust’ and ‘vpn’ for policies and traffic monitoring. 
By default zones named ‘trust’ and ‘untrust’ existed as virtual-wire type zones. 
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Figure 8. PA-200 Network Zones 
 
Next we will finish the interface configurations. Interfaces are configured as Layer 3 
interfaces with IP addressing according to Table 1. Choose ‘default’ as the virtual rout-
er and assign Ethernet1/1 to ‘trust’ zone and Ethernet1/2 to ‘untrust’ zone. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. PA-200 Network Interfaces 
 
To finalize the basic configurations, a default static route towards the third-party Router 
will be configured to establish routing between the devices. This is set under Network > 
Virtual Routers. 
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Figure 10. PA-200 Default IPv4 Routing 
 
To establish a tunnel, a tunnel interface needs to be configured. The Tunnel interface 
‘tunnel.1’ will be applied to the same ‘default’ Virtual Router instance as the other inter-
faces, but it will be assigned to the ‘vpn’ zone to more conveniently apply security poli-
cies. An IPv4 address is not required, since ASA will not be using them either. It would, 
however, allow the usage of the Tunnel Monitor feature under IPsec Tunnel settings, 
which can be used to poll the other side. 
 
 
Figure 11. PA-200 Tunnel Interfaces 
 
To start off the policy negotiations, IKE parameters will be configured. Much like with 
other features, a default IKE Crypto Profile already exists. Let us create a new one with 
a comprehensive name ‘IKE_P1_ASA’ identifying that we are configuring IKE Phase 1 
settings to be used in negotiations with ASA. As displayed in Figure 12 below, AES128 
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is used for encryption, SHA-1 for authentication and DH group 5 for key exchange. IKE 
SA lifetime will be set to 8 hours. 
 
 
Figure 12. PA-200 IKE Crypto Profile 
 
Continuing onto Phase 2, again a default set of parameters exists. This time the IPsec 
Crypto Profile will be named ‘IPsec_P2_ASA’ to distinguish it as Phase 2 parameter 
set. Here as well AES128 and SHA-1 will be selected. ESP will be selected as the IP-
sec protocol. IPsec SA lifetime will be set to 1h. No PFS will be required due to the 
relatively low SA lifetimes. 
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Figure 13. PA-200 IPsec Crypto Profile 
 
In order to bind all details about the VPN peer together an IKE Gateway will be defined. 
Here we set the physical interface to reach the VPN peer, VPN peer identity and au-
thentication method as PSK. The peer has a static IPv4 address 172.16.2.1 and it will 
also be used to identify the peer. In the Advanced Options tab the Exchange Mode is 
by default ‘auto’ which allows both MM and AM. Here we also map the IKE Crypto Pro-
file ‘IKE_P1_ASA’  to this IKE Gateway. 
 
 
Figure 14. PA-200 IKE Gateway 
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The Last step in configuring the VPN tunnel is creating an IPsec Tunnel. This IPsec 
Tunnel named ‘Tunnel_to_ASA’ will be bound to the Tunnel Interface ‘tunnel.1’. This is 
also where the IKE Gateway and IPsec Crypto Profile are linked together. If the Tunnel 
Interfaces had IP addresses assigned, we can enable the Tunnel Monitor option here. 
The QM Proxy-IDs or Encryption domains are also defined here, which is an imperative 
step when support for policy-based VPNs is required, like when peering with an ASA. 
 
 
Figure 15. PA-200 IPsec Tunnel 
 
In order to allow and monitor the traffic flow related to the VPN, we create policies to 
allow bidirectional traffic between the local network 10.0.1.0/24 and remote network 
10.0.2.0/24. We also explicitly allow incoming IKE and IPsec traffic for traffic logging. 
 
 
Figure 16. PA-200 Security Policies 
 
Lastly, a static route to the remote network 10.0.2.0/24 is required for traffic flow. These 
packets will be routed to the Tunnel Interface. No next-hop IPv4 address is configured, 
since the Interface does not use IP addresses. 
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Figure 17. PA-200 Static Route to remote network 
 
Optionally, we can implement NAT or Port Address Translation (PAT) to allow the in-
ternal LAN to access public networks. NAT operation is performed before IPsec, so it 
must be accounted for. However, as we have assigned a separate zone ‘vpn’ for the 
VPN tunnel interface, there will be no need to exempt tunnel traffic from address trans-
lation. Figure 18 displays the configured NAT rule on PA-200. 
 
 
Figure 18. PA-200 NAT Rules 
 
According to Figure 18 the NAT (PAT) rule will use the ‘untrust’ interface’s IP address 
for traffic sourced from internal network 10.0.1.0/24 and destined to any destination 
network belonging to ‘untrust’ zone.  
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5.2 Configuring ASA 5505 
 
The configuration wizards in ASA 5505’s CLI and ASDM tend to create an unnecessary 
number of default objects; thus the configurations will be done manually via CLI. 
 
Before the IPsec VPN tunnel can be configured the interfaces and default routing need 
to be configured. As ASA’s switch ports operate at Layer 2, we also configure VLAN 
interfaces to which the switch ports are assigned. For the site’s local network 
10.0.2.0/24 we assign the highest security level and call it our ‘trust’ zone. The host 
computer is connected to the Ethernet0/0 switch port. For the site’s third-party-
connected network 172.16.2.0/30 we assign the lowest security level and call it our 
‘untrust’ zone. The third-party router is connected to the Ethernet0/1 switch port. Final-
ly, we tell ASA to route packets towards the third-party upstream router by default. List-
ing 4 below shows how to set up this preliminary configuration. 
 
interface Vlan10 
 nameif trust 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 10.0.2.254 255.255.255.0  
! 
interface Vlan20 
 nameif untrust 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.16.2.1 255.255.255.252  
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 switchport access vlan 10 
 no shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/1 
 switchport access vlan 20 
 no shutdown 
! 
route untrust 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.16.2.2 
Listing 4. ASA’s preliminary configuration. 
 
Next we will define the traffic we wish to have traverse the VPN tunnel. For this we de-
fine an ACL (Access Control List) stating the source (10.0.2.0/24) and destination 
(10.0.1.0/24) networks. Let us call this ACL ‘PROXY-ID-ACL’. For future referencing, 
we create network objects for local and remote networks. Listing 5 below shows the 
equivalent configuration. 
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object network 10.0.1.0_24 
 subnet 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 
object network 10.0.2.0_24 
 subnet 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 
access-list PROXY-ID-ACL extended permit ip object 10.0.2.0_24 
object 10.0.1.0_24 
Listing 5. Configuring ASA’s network objects and ACLs. 
 
The configuration for the actual VPN tunnel and peer is shown in Listing 6 below. Ex-
clamation marks are used to separate the commands into logical sections. 
 
crypto ikev1 policy 10 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption aes 
 hash sha 
 group 5 
 lifetime 28800 
crypto ikev1 enable untrust 
! 
tunnel-group 172.16.1.1 type IPsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 172.16.1.1 IPsec-attributes 
 ikev1 pre-shared-key palocisco 
! 
crypto IPsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES1-SHA esp-aes esp-sha-hmac 
! 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 match address PROXY-ID-ACL 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set peer 172.16.1.1  
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES1-SHA 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set security-association lifetime seconds 
3600 
crypto map VPN_MAP interface untrust 
Listing 6. ASA’s VPN tunnel and peer configuration. 
 
For the IKE negotiations we first need at least one IKEv1 policy – also known as the 
ISAKMP policy. We define all the security parameters for the IKE policy set and enable 
the negotiations on the ‘untrust’ interface which terminates the VPN. Since PSK is used 
as the authentication method, let us next configure a tunnel group for the VPN peer. 
The tunnel is configured as Site-to-Site – or LAN-to-LAN (L2L) as ASA understands it. 
In the tunnel group we define the PSK (palocisco) for this IPsec VPN peer. 
 
With IKE settings configured, next we define our IPsec parameters. For this we create 
a transform-set ‘ESP-AES1-SHA’. By default the tunnel mode is used. Finally we link 
the VPN peer, transform-set and ACL together with the use of crypto map ‘VPN_MAP’. 
The crypto map is then applied to the same interface as the IKE policies. PFS is not 
configured. 
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As NAT is a common reason why traffic does not enter a VPN tunnel, in addition to 
incorrect routing and security policies denying the traffic, let us additionally implement it 
for the upstream traffic that will not pass the VPN tunnel. For this purpose we will need 
an extra exempt NAT rule in addition to the basic NAT according to Listing 7 below. 
 
nat (trust,untrust) source static 10.0.2.0_24 10.0.2.0_24 
destination static 10.0.1.0_24 10.0.1.0_24 no-proxy-arp route-
lookup 
nat (trust,untrust) after-auto source dynamic any interface 
Listing 7. ASA’s NAT rules. 
 
The first NAT rule, an exempt NAT rule, specifies that traffic sourced from network 
10.0.2.0/24 (zone ‘trust’) and destined to network 10.0.1.0/24 (zone ‘untrust’) is not to 
be translated. The second NAT rule, a dynamic PAT rule, states that any traffic 
sourced from the ‘trust’ zone and destined to the ‘untrust’ zone is to be dynamically 
translated to use the outgoing interface’s IP address as a new source and get a new 
custom source port assigned to this session. The keyword after-auto will guarantee 
that the more specific NAT rules will have a higher priority during a NAT lookup. 
 
6 VPN Experimenting and Troubleshooting 
 
In this chapter an issue at a time will be introduced to the VPN tunnel, reversing the 
troubleshooting process of using commands and tools to determine the cause of failure 
then deriving the proper corrective measure. In this case the cause of failure is known 
beforehand, and unfolding the methods, to determine that this very incident is the 
cause of failure, is the objective. For the test traffic simple ICMP Requests (Ping) 
sourced by the hosts are used. At first the available troubleshooting tools will be cov-
ered. 
 
On PA-200’s GUI the following troubleshooting tools are available: 
 Monitor > Logs > System 
 Monitor > Logs > Traffic 
 Monitor > Session Browser 
 Monitor > Packet Capture. 
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System Log helpfully logs IKE/IPsec-related events among other events. Traffic Log 
lists allowed and denied sessions matching the Security Policies that have logging en-
abled. While Traffic Log concentrates more on session history and traffic statistics, 
Session Browser offers details regarding the ongoing sessions and their flows. Packet 
Capture can capture packets at different stages of the firewall; received, inspected, 
transmitted and dropped. The output can then be viewed in the Wireshark format. 
 
On PA-200’s CLI for convenience’s sake, we will first modify the console/terminal out-
put such that it will use the whole screen worth of space to print the output. 
 
set cli terminal height 500 
set cli terminal width 500 
 
For debugging IKE negotiations we determine our logging level: normal or debug. The 
normal level, which is the default, will generally report about successes and failures, 
but typically the debug level is required to find the cause. For real-time CLI logging we 
specify tail command to follow the output of the management log called ‘ikemgr.log’ 
in real-time. The log can also be read later by replacing tail with less, which will 
print the whole log file’s contents. 
 
debug ike global on debug 
tail follow yes mp-log ikemgr.log 
 
To verify the tunnel’s parameters, SPI, lifetime and statistics, we use the show vpn 
flow command as such: 
show vpn flow tunnel-id 1 
 
On ASA 5505’s ASDM the following troubleshooting tools are available: 
 Monitor > VPN 
 Monitor > Logging 
 Wizards > Packet Capture Wizard. 
 
ASDM’s VPN Monitor is a neat utility to quickly verify or terminate establishment of 
VPN sessions, SA parameters and statistics. ASDM’s Logging feature, when properly 
filtered, is capable of recording the essential events in IKE/IPsec negotiations such as 
phase completions, SA establishment and termination and any blatant issues during 
negotiations. The logging level used in this study is the default informational, just less 
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detailed than the debugging level. Packet Capture Wizard can be used to confirm traffic 
flow through ASA. 
 
For VPN debugging ASA 5505 via CLI the following commands should prove useful: 
 
debug crypto condition peer 172.16.1.1 
debug crypto ikev1 127 
debug crypto ipsec 127 
 
The command debug crypto condition is used to narrow the debugging down to 
only the interesting output, in this case the tunnel with the peer 172.16.1.1. The com-
mand debug crypto ikev1 127 will trigger a debug output via the console termi-
nal. This will cover both IKEv1 phases, while the debug crypto ipsec variant will 
provide additional data regarding the IKEv1 Phase 2. The following integer can vary in 
range 1–255 determining the debug level. Level 127 is generally informative and com-
pact enough. In comparison the debug level 254 will also include ISAKMP header in-
formation and is required in order to view the contents of the message payloads such 
as the SA payload. 
 
To verify the state of an IPsec tunnel and the related SAs via CLI we type: 
 
show crypto ikev1 sa 
show crypto isakmp sa detail 
show crypto IPsec sa 
show vpn-sessiondb detail l2l 
 
The first displays the type, role and state for each active IKEv1 peer. While IKE SA 
state is typically of interest to determine how far the negotiations have progressed, the 
device in the role of a responder generally has easier time to determine the cause(s) of 
failure. The second covers both IKEv1 and IKEv2 SAs as well as the chosen policy set 
parameters. The third command displays extended information regarding all IPsec SAs 
and their statistics. The fourth provides detailed IKEv1, IKEv2 and IPsec session infor-
mation with all policy parameters, lifetimes and Proxy-IDs present. 
 
Due to the abundant amount of available troubleshooting tools, priority will be given to 
the concise information provided by PA-200’s GUI System Log and ASA’s ASDM Log-
ging features. Should these fail to catch onto the issue, the secondary measure will be 
CLI debugging followed by the rest of the methods. The troubleshooting subjects will 
be divided into CASEs each covering multiple scenarios depending on the experiment 
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arrangements. Any changes done in a scenario are rolled back for the following sce-
nario. 
 
 
6.1 CASE 01: Proxy-ID Mismatch 
 
Proxy-ID mismatch indicates that the tunnel endpoints have disagreement regarding 
which source and destination networks are allowed to traverse the tunnel. Proxy-IDs 
are negotiated during QM messages 1–2. While the IPsec policy proposal is contained 
in the SA payload, Proxy-IDs are located in a separate Identification payload. During 
the configuration phase ASA 5505 also refers to them as ACLs assigned to a crypto 
map. Three different scenarios were used in experimentation. 
 
In the first scenario Proxy-ID definitions were erased on PA-200, causing IKE Phase 2 
to fail. Figures 19 and 20 below portray the issue on ASA 5505 ASDM’s end. 
 
 
 
Figure 19. Proxy-ID mismatch 01: ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
 
Figure 20. Proxy-ID mismatch 01: ASA 5505 as initiator 
 
In both the role of a receiver and initiator ASDM Logging triggers errors during IKE 
Phase 2 QM negotiations. However, only as a receiver is ASDM able to deduce that 
this is due to a Proxy-ID mismatch. Additionally running debug crypto ikev1 127 
will bring the details shown in the following Listing 8 when ASA is acting as the initiator. 
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[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
IKE QM Initiator FSM error history (struct &0xc90b1218)  <state>, 
<event>:  QM_DONE, EV_ERROR-->QM_WAIT_MSG2, EV_TIMEOUT--
>QM_WAIT_MSG2, NullEvent-->QM_SND_MSG1, EV_SND_MSG-->QM_SND_MSG1, 
EV_START_TMR-->QM_SND_MSG1, EV_RESEND_MSG-->QM_WAIT_MSG2, 
EV_TIMEOUT-->QM_WAIT_MSG2, NullEvent 
Listing 8. ASA stuck at ‘QM_WAIT_MSG2’ stage. 
 
This output essentially does not reveal the issue either, but tells us that the peer does 
not  send the continuation message or any kind of notification. Thus ASA’s end hangs 
at the ‘QM_WAIT_MSG2’ state, being left waiting for the second message of QM which 
never comes. 
 
On PA-200’s end the logging output reflected similar results. Figures 21 and 22 below 
depict the System Log output on PA-200: 
 
 
Figure 21. Proxy-ID mismatch 01: PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 22. Proxy-ID mismatch 01: PA-200 as receiver 
 
As seen from Figure 21, the notification message ‘INVALID-ID-INFORMATION’ indi-
cates that the contents of the ID payload, containing the Proxy-ID data that PA was 
offering to ASA, were unacceptable. As a receiver PA-200 realizes that the issue is the 
peer’s Proxy-ID proposal not matching its own ones when comparing the two. 
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In the second scenario ASA’s ACL mapping was removed as follows: 
no crypto map VPN_MAP 1 match address PROXY-ID-ACL 
WARNING: The crypto map entry will be incomplete! 
 
Conveniently, without an ACL mapped to the crypto map, the ASA will not even attempt 
to establish the tunnel. It will, however, reply to PA-200’s attempts to do so. Figures 23 
and 24 show the log entries from both perspectives when PA initiates the negotiations: 
 
 
Figure 23. Proxy-ID mismatch 02: PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 24. Proxy-ID mismatch 02: ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
Figures 23 and 24 reflect essentially the same output as Figures 21 and 19; the receiv-
er (ASA) rejects the initiator’s (PA) Proxy-ID proposal and just sends a notification that 
the contents of the Identification payloads were no good. 
 
In the third scenario the ACL on ASA’s side was switched to one allowing all traffic to 
the tunnel. Configuration changes on ASA were as follows: 
 
access-list FALSE-ACL extended permit ip any any  
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 match address FALSE-ACL 
 
Having ASA initiate the negotiations will cause negotiations to break down with slight 
delay. Figures 25 and 26 show how PA will not accept ASA’s proposal for Proxy-IDs, 
and how ASA after determining that negotiations do not progress terminates the IPsec 
negotiations and the IKE SA, as no IPsec SAs were successfully established. 
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Figure 25. Proxy-ID mismatch 03: ASA 5505 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 26. Proxy-ID mismatch 03: PA-200 as receiver 
 
Figures 27 and 28 below show PA-200 assuming the initiator’s role in turn. 
 
 
Figure 27. Proxy-ID mismatch 03: PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 28. Proxy-ID mismatch 03: ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
As a receiver ASA agrees to establish the IPsec SA with the proposed Proxy-IDs par-
tially matching its own. Soon enough ASA realizes that its crypto map ACL does not 
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have matching IPsec SAs even though an IKE SA has been established. Thus ASA 
continues offering its 0.0.0.0/0 network only to get rejected by PA time and time again. 
ASA then continues to attempt creating a new IPsec SA pair. 
 
6.2 CASE 02: Pre-Shared Key (PSK) Mismatch 
 
PSK mismatch during IKE Phase 1 occurs when the receiver is unable to process the 
MM message 5, which directly follows the DH key exchange. The Receiver’s inability to 
process the packet will prompt it to resend the previous MM message 4. As a result 
The Initiator will receive a duplicate message and end up resending MM message 5 
and will expect MM message 6 in return. 
 
To start off, Figures 29 and 30 below play out the scenario when PA initiates the nego-
tiations: 
 
 
Figure 29. PSK mismatch: PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 30. PSK mismatch: ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
As seen in Figure 29, PA-200 ends up hanging and eventually time-outing the negotia-
tions. ASA 5505, being on the receiving end, realizes an error processing the encrypt-
ed packet and even suspects a mismatched PSK as proven by Figure 30. This deduc-
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tion is based on the decryption resulting in invalid payloads. ASA sends this information 
to PA as a separate message with Notification payload of type ‘PAYLOAD-
MALFORMED’. PA’s debugging does not indicate to trigger any actions on PA’s side 
regarding this piece of information. Such details can be spotted by running Packet Cap-
ture on PA filtered by the peer addresses. Figure 31 shows the Packet Capture output. 
 
 
Figure 31. PSK mismatch: PA-200’s Packet Capture as initiator 
 
Reverting the negotiator roles, the outcome appears as follows: 
 
 
Figure 32. PSK mismatch: ASA 5505 as initiator 
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Figure 33. PSK mismatch: PA-200 as receiver 
 
Figures 32 and 33 show that as in the former case, the initiator (ASA) cannot determine 
the issue by itself, while the receiver (PA) suspects a PSK mismatch, which is indeed 
correct. The MM messages 5–6 are encrypted, so with decrypting them with incorrect 
key(s), the payloads will end up invalid. However, PA withholds the information and the 
MM messages 4–5 continue to be retransmitted. ASA as the initiator soon ends the 
loop and informs PA via an encrypted message carrying a Delete payload specifying 
the SPIs – or better known as initiator and responder cookies during Phase 1. Listing 9 
presents how the error loop occurs. 
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG] IP = 172.16.1.1, IKE MM Initiator FSM error history 
(struct &0xcbf3f4c0)  <state>, <event>:  MM_DONE, EV_ERROR--
>MM_WAIT_MSG6, EV_PROB_AUTH_FAIL-->MM_WAIT_MSG6, EV_TIMEOUT--
>MM_WAIT_MSG6, NullEvent-->MM_SND_MSG5, EV_SND_MSG-->MM_SND_MSG5, 
EV_START_TMR-->MM_SND_MSG5, EV_RESEND_MSG-->MM_WAIT_MSG6, 
EV_RESEND_MSG 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, IKE SA 
MM:ef8f5050 terminating:  flags 0x01000022, refcnt 0, tuncnt 0 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
sending delete/delete with reason message  
Listing 9. ASA stuck at ‘MM_WAIT_MSG6’ stage. 
 
Upon receiving and decrypting the message, PA chooses to ignore it, since the SA has 
not been established yet, continuing to resend MM message 4. ASA, having already 
deleted the SAD entry for this incomplete ISAKMP (IKE) SA, now sends PA a notifica-
tion of type ‘INVALID-COOKIE’ since the cookie (SPI) pair identifying the SA that was 
being negotiated no longer exist in its database. Running Packet Capture on PA again 
reveals how this exchange looks like as printed on Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34. PSK mismatch: PA-200’s Packet Capture as receiver 
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PA gets to receive two of such notifications before its negotiations timeout. It becomes 
apparent that PA’s support for ISAKMP notifications is at a lower level than ASA. 
 
 
6.3 CASE 03: IKE Policy Set Mismatch 
 
IKE policy negotiation takes place during MM messages 1–2 and is used to agree on a 
policy set comprising an encryption algorithm and key length, hash algorithm, DH 
group, authentication method and key lifetime. Mismatches in the encryption algorithm, 
hash algorithm, DH group and authentication method result in clear error messages, 
whereas lifetime is more flexible and may thus result in difficult-to-spot misbehaviours 
when a session reaches the rekeying stage. 
 
In order to view IKE policy proposals as the receiver for the CLI debugging we will use 
debug level on PA and 254 level on ASA as follows: 
 
PA-200> debug ike global on debug 
ASA-5505# debug crypto ikev1 254 
 
In the experiments the IKE policy parameters were changed on PA-200 one by one 
and the output recorded; AES128 was changed to 3DES, SHA-1 to MD5 and DH5 to 
DH14. Encryption and hash algorithm mismatches had the exact same error messag-
es, so these will be covered together. This will be followed by the DH group mismatch 
with a more distinct reaction. Figures 35 and 36 picture the IKEv1 encryption and/or 
hash mismatch scenario when PA-200 initiates the negotiations. 
 
 
Figure 35. IKEv1 policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): PA-200 as initiator 
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Figure 36. IKEv1 policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
On ASA’s CLI debugging this is indicated as shown in Listing 10 below. 
 
[IKEv1]IP = 172.16.1.1, IKE_DECODE SENDING Message (msgid=0) with 
payloads : HDR + NOTIFY (11) + NONE (0) total length : 92 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]IP = 172.16.1.1, All SA proposals found unacceptable 
[IKEv1]IP = 172.16.1.1, Error processing payload: Payload ID: 1 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]IP = 172.16.1.1, IKE MM Responder FSM error history 
(struct &0xcbf2e110)  <state>, <event>:  MM_DONE, EV_ERROR--
>MM_START, EV_RCV_MSG-->MM_START, EV_START_MM-->MM_START, … 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]IP = 172.16.1.1, IKE SA MM:00710c6c terminating:  
flags 0x01000002, refcnt 0, tuncnt 0 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]IP = 172.16.1.1, sending delete/delete with reason 
message 
Listing 10. ASA rejecting all IKEv1 proposals. 
 
Here we may observe that PA’s proposal is rejected and the notification ‘NO-
PROPOSAL-CHOSEN’ is send. PA chooses to ignore this and simply resend the pro-
posal until negotiations timeout. 
 
Swapping the roles we get an output equivalent to Figures 37 and 38. 
 
 
Figure 37. IKEv1 policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): ASA 5505 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 38. IKEv1 policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): PA-200 as receiver 
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The scarce amount of output data can be explained by looking at PA’s CLI output as 
shown in Listing 11 below. 
 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:514:print_ph1mismatched(): rejected 
enctype: DB(prop#1:trns#1):Peer(prop#1:trns#1) = 3DES:AES 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:278:get_ph1approval(): no suitable 
proposal found 
[PROTO_ERR]: isakmp_ident.c:1030:ident_r1recv(): 0:? - 
172.16.2.1[500]:(nil):failed to get valid proposal. 
[PROTO_ERR]: ikev1.c:1415:isakmp_ph1begin_r(): failed to process 
packet. 
[INFO]: ikev1.c:2485:log_ph1deleted(): ====> PHASE-1 SA DELETED 
<==== 
Listing 11. PA rejecting all IKE proposals. 
 
While ASA did send a notification message, PA did no such thing. PA compares the 
policy sets until the last one, determines the reason for rejection and ends the negotia-
tions there while ASA retries until timeout. 
 
Next comes the DH group mismatch scenario. Having PA to initiate the negotiations, 
the output shown in Figures 39 and 40 will be generated. 
 
 
Figure 39. IKEv1 policy mismatch (DH group): PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 40. IKEv1 policy mismatch (DH group): ASA 5505 as receiver 
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The error messages and behavior are about the same for DH group mismatch as in the 
previous scenario of encryption or hash algorithm mismatch. Only notable difference is 
that ASA reports the DH group mismatch. Apparently for this software version DH 
group 14 and above appears as ‘Unknown’ whereas group 2 would appear properly. 
PA receives ASA’s mismatch notifications like seen in Figure 39. 
 
In the case of ASA initiating the negotiations, PA would react in the same manner as 
with encryption or hash mismatch; realizing DH group mismatch has occurred and end-
ing the negotiations without a word. 
 
Finally we have the IKEv1 SA lifetime mismatch. This will be broken down into the fol-
lowing four scenarios: 
1. PA initiates negotiations with a higher lifetime value (86400s > 28800s) 
2. ASA initiates negotiations with a lower lifetime value (28800s < 86400s) 
3. PA initiates negotiations with a lower lifetime value (7200s < 28800s) 
4. ASA initiates negotiations with a higher lifetime value (28800s > 7200s). 
 
In scenario 1 when PA proposes 86400 second lifetime value, ASA replies without 
changing the lifetime value in the policy set. However, ASA has chosen to utilize its 
lower lifetime of 28800 seconds. ASA will convey this information to PA at the end of 
MM negotiations via a notification message ‘RESPONDER-LIFETIME’. The parties will 
continue with mismatched IKE SA lifetimes until ASA prompts a rekeying process. 
 
In scenario 2 when ASA proposes 28800 second lifetime value, PA agrees to the lower 
key lifetime value over its higher 86400 second lifetime. ASA receives confirmation of 
this in the MM message 2. 
 
In scenario 3 when PA proposes 7200 second lifetime value, ASA will agree on the 
proposed lower lifetime value over its higher 28800 second lifetime. No changes occur 
to the following message exchanges. 
 
In scenario 4 when ASA proposes 28800 second lifetime value, PA replies without 
changing the lifetime value in the policy set. However, PA has chosen to utilize its low-
er lifetime of 7200 seconds. PA abstains from sending the notification message to ASA. 
The parties will continue with mismatched IKE SA lifetimes until PA prompts a rekeying 
process. 
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IKE SA lifetime mismatch thus does not generate blatant warning or error messages, at 
most notification messages informing the peer. In the end vendors are given leeway in 
deciding how the peers will react to these lifetime mismatch situations. [12, 22–23]. 
 
 
6.4 CASE 04: IPsec Policy Set Mismatch 
 
The IPsec policy negotiation takes place during QM messages 1–2 and is used to 
agree on a policy set comprising an encapsulation protocol, encryption algorithm and 
key length, hash algorithm, key lifetime in seconds and key lifesize in kilobytes. An op-
tional DH group is also negotiated if PFS is enabled. Tunnelling mode will be the solely 
used encryption mode. Very much like during IKE policy set negotiation, IPsec policy 
set mismatches in encapsulation protocol, encryption algorithm, hash algorithm or DH 
group (PFS) result in clear error messages, whereas lifetime is more flexible. 
 
In order to view IPsec policy proposals as the receiver for the CLI debugging we will 
use debug level on PA and 254 level on ASA as follows: 
 
PA-200> debug ike global on debug 
ASA-5505# debug crypto ikev1 254 
ASA-5505# debug crypto ipsec 254 
 
In the experiments the IPsec policy parameters were changed on PA-200 one by one 
and the output recorded; AES128 was changed to AES256, SHA-1 to MD5, PFS group 
to DH2 when enabled and ESP encapsulation to AH. The more varied IPsec SA life-
time talks will be covered at the end of the section. 
 
As with during IKE policy negotiations, IPsec encryption and hash algorithm mismatch-
es had the exact same error messages, so these will be covered together. This will be 
followed by the DH group (PFS) mismatch and encapsulation protocol mismatch. Fig-
ures 41 and 42 depict the IPsec encryption and/or hash mismatch scenario when PA-
200 initiates the negotiations. 
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Figure 41. IPsec policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 42. IPsec policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
Having received PA’s IPsec policy set proposal, ASA rejects the mismatched set and 
sends PA the notification message ‘NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN’. ASA then informs PA 
of IKE SA deletion. PA still continues to offer its IPsec proposal until negotiation 
timeout. Meanwhile ASA drops the following proposals which no longer have an asso-
ciated SA. 
 
For the reverse interaction, Figures 43 and 44 reflect the occurring negotiations. 
 
 
Figure 43. IPsec policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): ASA 5505 as initiator 
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Figure 44. IPsec policy mismatch (encryption or hash algorithm): PA-200 as receiver 
 
Just as above, once ASA’s IPsec proposal gets rejected by PA, PA sends the notifica-
tion message ‘NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN’. Listing 12 shows PA’s CLI output. 
 
[DEBUG]: IPsec_doi.c:1172:get_ph2approvalx(): peer's single 
bundle: 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1057:printsaproto():  (proto_id=ESP spisize=4 
spi=de172888 spi_p=00000000 encmode=Tunnel reqid=0:0) 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1091:printsatrns():   (trns_id=AES encklen=128 
authtype=hmac-sha) 
[DEBUG]: IPsec_doi.c:1175:get_ph2approvalx(): my single bundle: 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1057:printsaproto():  (proto_id=ESP spisize=4 
spi=00000000 spi_p=00000000 encmode=Tunnel reqid=0:0) 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1091:printsatrns():   (trns_id=AES encklen=128 
authtype=hmac-md5) 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:564:cmpsatrns(): authtype mismatched: my:hmac-
md5 peer:hmac-sha 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:1183:get_ph2approvalx(): not matched 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:1146:get_ph2approval(): no suitable 
policy found. 
[INTERNAL_ERR]: ikev1.c:1621:isakmp_ph2begin_r(): failed to pre-
process packet. 
Listing 12. PA rejecting all IPsec proposals. 
 
Having compared ASA’s proposal to its own, PA compiles the notification message to 
be sent to ASA. Each consecutive time ASA’s proposal arrives, it performs the same 
IPsec policy comparison and replies with the same notification message until ASA’s 
negotiations timeout and notification for IPSEC and IKE SA deletion arrives. 
 
When PFS is enabled on PA, but disabled on ASA, the System Log output will look 
exactly the same when PA is in the initiator’s role as if the mismatch’s cause was en-
cryption or hash algorithm. This occurs since ASA does not have a PFS group config-
ured to compare the proposal’s group to. When PA, who has PFS enabled, is in the 
receiving end, the PFS group mismatch is apparent on the GUI’s System Log alone. 
43 
 
PA’s PFS has been set to DH group 2 while ASA does not have it enabled, which 
shows up as DH group 0. Figures 45 and 46 portray this exchange scenario. 
 
 
Figure 45. IPsec policy mismatch (PFS): ASA 5505 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 46. IPsec policy mismatch (PFS): PA-200 as receiver 
 
In the event that PA proposes the usage of AH encapsulation to ASA who uses ESP – 
or vice versa, the system log output will not change; same ‘NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN’ 
notification message is sent once again. The CLI debug output in the receiver’s point of 
view changes slightly for both parties. ASA’s reaction is as shown in Listing 13. 
 
 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
processing IPsec SA payload 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
AH proposal not supported 
[IKEv1]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
All IPsec SA proposals found unacceptable! 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
sending notification message 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
sending delete/delete with reason message 
Listing 13. ASA encounters an encapsulation mismatch. 
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When ASA in turn initiates the negotiations, PA’s debug output is as shown in Listing 
14 below. 
 
[DEBUG]: IPsec_doi.c:1172:get_ph2approvalx(): peer's single 
bundle: 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1057:printsaproto():  (proto_id=ESP spisize=4 
spi=c1c4d87d spi_p=00000000 encmode=Tunnel reqid=0:0) 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1091:printsatrns():   (trns_id=AES encklen=128 
authtype=hmac-sha) 
[DEBUG]: IPsec_doi.c:1175:get_ph2approvalx(): my single bundle: 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1057:printsaproto():  (proto_id=AH spisize=4 
spi=00000000 spi_p=00000000 encmode=Tunnel reqid=0:0) 
[DEBUG]: proposal.c:1085:printsatrns():   (trns_id=SHA1 
authtype=hmac-sha) 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:1183:get_ph2approvalx(): not matched 
[PROTO_ERR]: IPsec_doi.c:1146:get_ph2approval(): no suitable 
policy found. 
[INTERNAL_ERR]: ikev1.c:1621:isakmp_ph2begin_r(): failed to pre-
process packet. 
<output omitted> 
[DEBUG]: isakmp_inf.c:807:isakmp_info_send_common(): 
sendto Information notify. 
<output omitted> 
[INFO]: isakmp_inf.c:1437:isakmp_info_recv_d(): 
IKE IPSEC KEY_DELETE recvd:  SPI:0xC1C4D87D. 
Listing 14. PA encounters an encapsulation mismatch. 
 
From PA’s CLI debugging output we can also note that AH indeed does not exercise 
encryption as this field is filled with its hash algorithm (SHA1) instead. Interestingly 
enough ASA has been confirmed to be the more aggressive peer with regards to SA 
terminations be it as initiator or receiver. 
 
Last but not least comes IPsec SA lifetime and lifesize mismatch. PA’s lifesize has 
been left at the default zero value, which practically makes it unlimited, thus making 
ASA’s specified lifesize value being preferred. Like with IKEv1 SA lifetime troubleshoot-
ing, this will be broken down into the following four scenarios: 
1. PA initiates negotiations with a higher lifetime value (7200s > 3600s) 
2. ASA initiates negotiations with a lower lifetime value (3600s < 7200s) 
3. PA initiates negotiations with a lower lifetime value (1800s < 3600s) 
4. ASA initiates negotiations with a higher lifetime value (3600s > 1800s). 
 
In scenario 1 when PA proposes 7200 second lifetime value, ASA returns the proposal 
and adds a notification payload specifying that it has chosen the lower lifetime value of 
3600 seconds and lifesize of 4608000 KB. PA updates its IPsec SA lifetime and lifesize 
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to the preferred values in the notification payload according to ASA’s notification as 
shown in Listing 15 below. 
 
[IKEv1]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
Overriding Initiator's IPsec rekeying duration from 7200 to 3600 
seconds 
[IKEv1]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
Overriding Initiator's IPsec rekeying duration from 0 to 4608000 
Kbs 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
Sending RESPONDER LIFETIME notification to Initiator 
Listing 15. ASA forcing its lower IPsec SA lifetime and lifesize onto PA. 
 
In scenario 2 when ASA proposes 3600 second lifetime value, PA agrees to the lower 
SA lifetime proposal and the preferred lifesize of 4608000 KB. 
 
In scenario 3 when PA proposes 1800 second lifetime value, ASA agrees to the lower 
SA lifetime proposal, but notifies PA of choosing its preferred lifesize as shown in List-
ing 16 below. 
 
[IKEv1]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
Overriding Initiator's IPsec rekeying duration from 0 to 4608000 
Kbs 
[IKEv1 DEBUG]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, 
Sending RESPONDER LIFETIME notification to Initiator 
Listing 16. ASA choosing its preferred IPsec SA lifesize. 
 
 
In scenario 4 when ASA proposes 3600 second lifetime value, PA decides to keep its 
lower lifetime of 1800 seconds and includes a notification payload in its response. PA 
also unconditionally agrees to the proposed IPsec SA lifesize of 4608000 KB. ASA in 
turn chooses to update its lifetime value to PA’s lower 1800 seconds as shown in List-
ing 17 below. 
 
[IKEv1 DECODE] Responder Lifetime decode follows (outb 
SPI[4]|attributes): 
[IKEv1 DECODE] 0000: B9823F3F 80010001 00020004 00000708      
[IKEv1]Group = 172.16.1.1, IP = 172.16.1.1, Responder forcing 
change of IPsec rekeying duration from 3600 to 1800 seconds 
Listing 17. PA forcing its lower IPsec SA lifetime onto ASA. 
 
In conclusion, IPsec SA lifetime negotiations between these two peers will always 
agree on the lower lifetime value regardless of the negotiation role. While PA’s debug 
46 
 
output shows that ASA’s notification arrives, it does not explicitly state whether the noti-
fication is ignored or agreed upon until the lifetime is updated at the end of the negotia-
tions. 
 
6.5 CASE 05: IKE Version Mismatch 
 
While the theoretical part of this study does not cover IKEv2 protocol in detail, introduc-
ing a scenario where one peer speaks IKEv1 and another IKEv2 is definitely worthwhile 
to find out how it actually affects the negotiations. To implement the configurations for 
IKEv2, we will use Cisco’s IKE migration feature, which requires an existing IPsec VPN 
configuration for IKEv1 with PSK authentication and will create a matching configura-
tion for IKEv2. Issuing the CLI command migrate l2l on ASA will result in the fol-
lowing configuration changes shown in Listing 18. 
 
crypto IPsec ikev2 IPsec-proposal ESP-AES1-SHA 
 protocol esp encryption aes 
 protocol esp integrity sha-1 
! 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set ikev2 IPsec-proposal ESP-AES1-SHA 
! 
crypto ikev2 policy 10 
 encryption aes 
 integrity sha 
 group 5 
 prf sha 
 lifetime seconds 28800 
crypto ikev2 enable untrust 
! 
tunnel-group 172.16.1.1 IPsec-attributes 
 ikev2 remote-authentication pre-shared-key ***** 
 ikev2 local-authentication pre-shared-key ***** 
Listing 18. ASA migrating from IKEv1 to IKEv2. 
 
IKEv2 now functions parallel to IKEv1 sharing the same transform set and crypto map. 
IKEv2 will automatically use the same PSK as was configured for IKEv1. In order to 
debug IKEv2 the following additional CLI debugging commands are introduced: 
debug crypto ike-common 5 
debug crypto ikev2 platform 4 
debug crypto ikev2 protocol 4 
 
The command debug crypto ike-common will print general tunnel  management 
output for both IKEv1 and IKEv2, thus making it useful to determine which protocol is 
used to build a tunnel. The commands debug crypto ikev2 platform and de-
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bug crypto ikev2 protocol generate messages for IKEv2 negotiation exchang-
es and protocol’s processing. The debugging level can be set within the range 1–255. 
A lower debugging level is used here to just debug the version mismatch scenarios. 
 
For the first scenario, we will temporarily disable IKEv1 forcing ASA to only negotiate 
with IKEv2. To disable IKEv1 negotiations on the peer-facing interface, we issue: 
no crypto ikev1 enable untrust 
 
Initiating the negotiations from PA’s side will only prompt connection building and 
teardown on the informational syslog level. PA will keep on sending its IKEv1 proposal 
until the SA negotiation times out. ASA’s IKEv1 CLI debugging prints the output shown 
in Listing 19. 
 
[IKEv1]IKE Receiver: Discarding IKEv1 packet, disabled on 
<untrust> 
[IKEv1]IKE Receiver: Packet received on 172.16.2.1:500 from 
172.16.1.1:500 
Listing 19. ASA rejects unsupported IKEv1 packet. 
 
After reversing the roles and initiating the negotiations from ASA, PA generates output 
matching Listing 20. 
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[IKE COMMON DEBUG]Tunnel Manager dispatching a KEY_ACQUIRE 
message to IKEv2.  Map Tag = VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
IKEv2-PLAT-2: mapped to tunnel group 172.16.1.1 using peer IP 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (1): Sending Packet  
[To 172.16.1.1:500/From 172.16.2.1:500/VRF i0:f0] 
IKEv2-PLAT-3: (1): SENT PKT [IKE_SA_INIT]  
[172.16.2.1]:500->[172.16.1.1]:500 InitSPI=0x53c7d1aa6c4267bd 
RespSPI=0x0000000000000000 MID=00000000 
<output omitted> 
IKEv2-PROTO-1: (1): Maximum number of retransmissions reached 
IKEv2-PROTO-2: (1): Deleting SA 
IKEv2-PLAT-1: Failed to remove peer correlation entry from 
cikePeerCorrTable.  Local Type = 0.  Local Address = 0.0.0.0.  
Remote Type = 0.  Remote Address = 0.0.0.0.  Correlation Peer 
Index = 0. IPSEC Tunnel Index = 0. 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]IKEv2 was unsuccessful at setting up a tunnel.   
Map Tag = VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]Tunnel Manager has failed to establish an L2L 
SA.  All configured IKE versions failed to establish the tunnel. 
Map Tag= VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]Tunnel Manager Removed entry.   
Map Tag = VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
Listing 20. ASA’s IKEv2 proposals are rejected until timeout. 
 
On PA’s end this generates the output shown in Listing 21. 
 
[DEBUG]: isakmp.c:1043:isakmp_handler():  
521 bytes message received from 172.16.2.1[500] 
[PROTO_WARN]: ikev2.c:262:ikev2_input():  
0:172.16.1.1[500] - 172.16.2.1[500]:0x103cc268:unknown ikev2 peer 
Listing 21. PA rejects unsupported IKEv2 proposals. 
 
So, in both cases the IKE proposals are silently discarded, and the initiating peer will 
continue offering their proposal until negotiation timeout. 
 
For the next scenario IKEv1 will be re-enabled on ASA to support both versions in par-
allel. When ASA begins the IKE SA negotiations it begins with the preferred IKEv2, but 
after timing out it will proceed to attempt IKEv1 negotiations, which then succeed. PA 
will as before discard the IKEv2 proposals and only reply when IKEv1 proposals are 
received. Listing 22 shows the common IKE exchange occurring on ASA’s CLI. 
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[IKE COMMON DEBUG]Tunnel Manager dispatching a KEY_ACQUIRE 
message to IKEv2.  Map Tag = VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
<output omitted> 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]IKEv2 was unsuccessful at setting up a tunnel.   
Map Tag = VPN_MAP.  Map Sequence Number = 1. 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]Tunnel Manager dispatching a KEY_ACQUIRE 
message to IKEv1 after a failed attempt..  Map Tag = VPN_MAP. 
Map Sequence Number = 1. 
<output omitted> 
[IKE COMMON DEBUG]IKEv1 was successful at setting up a tunnel. 
Map Tag = VPN_MAP. Map Sequence Number = 1. 
Listing 22. ASA falls back to IKEv1 after failed IKEv2 negotiations. 
 
For reference, it took 7 proposals and 2 minutes for IKEv2 to timeout before IKEv1 was 
given the baton. Should PA initiate the negotiations, ASA would automatically revert to 
IKEv1 as soon as the first proposal comes, since the ISAKMP (IKE) header comes with 
a Version field. 
 
6.6 CASE 06: IKE Mode Mismatch 
 
IKE mode or exchange type is determined by the initiator in its first message. The re-
ceiver will then either agree or disagree on the proposed exchange type. By default 
both ASA 5505 and PA-200 will use auto mode, which will initiate negotiations using 
MM, but will agree to both MM and AM proposals. That being the case, the only sce-
nario to be covered is having PA configured for AM and ASA for MM. Figure 47 shows 
PA-200 being configured for AM. 
 
 
Figure 47. Reconfiguring PA-200 IKE Gateway for AM. 
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Now, on the ASA’s CLI we can disable AM and only allow MM with the command: 
crypto ikev1 am-disable 
 
When ASA receives PA’s IKE policy proposal, it only needs to look at the ISAKMP 
header’s Exchange Type field to determine the following action: 
[IKEv1]IP = 172.16.1.1, Aggressive Mode connections disabled on 
interface ... dropping pkt 
 
When PA receives ASA’s IKE policy proposal, the reaction is just as anticlimactic: 
[PROTO_ERR]: ikev1.c:1341:isakmp_ph1begin_r(): IKE phase-1 request 
for gateway VPN_Peer_ASA is rejected: main mode is not allowed by 
configuration. 
 
In both cases the receiver promptly discards the proposals. In these scenarios the initi-
ator will not be able to figure out why the negotiations fail. 
 
 
6.7 CASE 07: NAT Traversal (NAT-T) 
 
NAT during transit introduces more design changes to the IPsec VPN configuration 
than NAT-T alone can fix. It will also require changes to peer IP address and Local and 
Remote Identifiers depending on which kind of address translation takes place. Once 
NAT is confirmed to exist in transit, we are concerned about whether it is a static or 
dynamic NAT. Any peer behind a dynamic NAT should only take on the role of an initia-
tor, since the other peer would not be able to reach the peer behind dynamic NAT 
when the NAT entry is not in place. [13, 6–7]. 
 
While any NAT/PAT device in transit is known to modify the IP addresses and/or 
TCP/UDP ports, yet another consideration is that IPsec traffic may end up dropped 
altogether. The issue lies in ESP header not specifying port numbers. Some NAT/PAT 
devices discard ESP encapsulated traffic on sight, since address translation cannot be 
performed. [13, 7]. 
 
In this study we will enforce NAT on the third-party router such that ASA will be inside 
NAT. The router configuration is as shown in Listing 23. 
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interface GigabitEthernet0/0 
 description LINK_to_PA200 
 ip address 172.16.1.2 255.255.255.252 
 ip nat outside 
! 
interface GigabitEthernet0/1 
 description LINK_to_ASA5505 
 ip address 172.16.2.2 255.255.255.252 
 ip nat inside 
! 
interface Loopback0 
 ip address 172.16.3.1 255.255.255.0 
! 
ip nat inside source static 172.16.2.1 172.16.3.2 
Listing 23. Third-party router’s interface and NAT configurations. 
 
With such a static NAT the NAT-designated inside local address 172.16.2.1 will be 
known as the global address 172.16.3.2 behind the NAT-designated outside interface 
and vice versa. The single NAT rule will create bi-directional address translations. 
While addresses solely used for NAT, such as the 172.16.3.0/24 here, are not required 
to be of a network connected to the NAT/PAT device in order to be available, Loop-
back0 was configured to clearly show where this network exists in the topology. 
 
Configuration changes on PA are then necessary, since ASA will no longer be reacha-
ble via the previously known peer IP address 172.16.2.1. 
 
 
Figure 48. Reconfiguring PA-200 IKE Gateway in preparation for NAT. 
 
52 
 
ASA’s identity will remain as 172.16.2.1, but the packets destined to the peer will be 
sent to 172.16.3.2 instead. Since ASA is inside NAT, it will still reach PA at the address 
172.16.1.1. 
 
NAT-T has already been enabled on PA-200 during the configuration stage. This soft-
ware version of ASA 5505 also seems to construct NAT-T payloads without explicitly 
needing to configure the feature. Without further ado, let us look at how a successful 
IKEv1 negotiation with NAT-T looks like, as shown in Figures 49 and 50. 
 
 
Figure 49. NAT-T with ASA inside NAT; PA-200 as initiator 
 
 
Figure 50. NAT-T with ASA inside NAT; ASA 5505 as receiver 
 
Once NAT Discovery has been confirmed during MM messages 3–4, IKEv1 starts us-
ing UDP port 4500 instead of 500. UDP encapsulation with source and destination port 
4500 continues during IKE SA negotiations, IPsec SA negotiations and then the ESP 
encapsulated data exchanges, which it was originally setup for. We may also verify the 
address translations on the NAT Router as shown in Listing 24. 
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Router# show  ip nat translations  
Pro Inside global      Inside local       Outside local      
Outside global 
udp 172.16.3.2:500     172.16.2.1:500     172.16.1.1:500     
172.16.1.1:500 
udp 172.16.3.2:4500    172.16.2.1:4500    172.16.1.1:4500    
172.16.1.1:4500 
--- 172.16.3.2         172.16.2.1         ---                --- 
Listing 24. Third-party router’s NAT translations with NAT-T. 
 
In another scenario ASA was placed behind dynamic PAT instead of static NAT. The 
purpose of this was to see the PAT Router drop the ESP packets devoid of port num-
bers. However, this caused slightly unexpected results as after the successful negotia-
tions ESP traffic was not obstructed at all. The NAT translations appeared according to 
the following Listing 25. 
 
Router#show  ip nat translations  
Pro Inside global      Inside local       Outside local      
Outside global 
esp 172.16.3.2:0 172.16.2.1:0 172.16.1.1:2117378768 
172.16.1.1:7E34A2D0 
udp 172.16.3.2:500     172.16.2.1:500     172.16.1.1:500     
172.16.1.1:500 
esp 172.16.3.2:3677576430 172.16.2.1:DB335CEE 172.16.1.1:0   
172.16.1.1:0 
Listing 25. Third-party router’s NAT translations without NAT-T. 
 
The hexadecimal value ‘0x7E34A2D0’ is the SPI for ASA’s inbound IPsec SA and PA’s 
outbound IPsec SA. The value ‘2117378768’ on the other hand is the decimal value 
matching that hexadecimal value. Likewise the hexadecimal value ‘0xDB335CEE’ is 
the SPI for PA’s inbound IPsec SA and ASA’s outbound IPsec SA, and ‘3677576430’ 
its equivalent decimal number. In other words, due to a feature in Cisco IOS (Version 
15.6 in this case), the ESP packets can be subjected to not only NAT but PAT as well. 
 
In the final scenario PA’s IKE Gateway configurations were reverted to previously con-
figured without local identifiers and the address 172.16.2.1 as ASA’s peer address. 
ASA was placed behind dynamic PAT instead of static NAT. In such a situation IKEv1 
initiations from PA passed Router without translations, but the return traffic got trans-
lated as sourced by Router’s PA-facing address. PA views this as follows: 
ikev1.c:456:ikev1_main(): malformed cookie received or the spi ex-
pired. 
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Since the peer IP address and cookie, equivalent to an SPI, are used to identify an IKE 
SA, with the peer IP address changed, the message cannot be connected to any exist-
ing SA negotiations. PA will as usual continue offering its proposal to 172.16.2.1 until 
timeout. In case ASA initiates the negotiations, PA will know straight away to discard 
the packets from this unknown peer address (Router exercising PAT) as seen from the 
CLI output: 
[PROTO_ERR]: ikev1.c:1317:isakmp_ph1begin_r(): Couldn't find 
configuration for IKE phase-1 request for peer IP 172.16.1.2[500]. 
 
 
6.8 Summary: Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol 
(ISAKMP) Notification Messages 
 
This section will compile the relevant ISAKMP Notification messages that were discov-
ered during the troubleshooting section in this study. Since the errors and warnings 
during debugging ASA and PA were varying and changed ever-so-slightly according to 
each scenario, it seems more productive to gather the standardized notification mes-
sages that described the mismatch situations for future reference. Table 2 lists and 
explains the notification message types appearing in the Notification Payload of 
ISAKMP (IKE) headers. 
 
 
Table 2. ISAKMP Notification messages 
Code Notification Explanation 
4 INVALID-COOKIE 
The IKE SA being referenced by the 
cookie pair no longer exists 
14 NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN 
IKE/IPsec policies do not match 
(non-zero SPIs for IPsec) 
16 PAYLOAD-MALFORMED 
Decrypted contents unreadable; 
Likely incorrect PSK 
18 INVALID-ID-INFORMATION Proxy-IDs do not match 
24576 RESPONDER-LIFETIME 
Responder has chosen to enforce 
lower SA lifetime 
 
The notification type ‘INVALID-ID-INFORMATION’ occurs during the IPsec Phase 2 
negotiations indicating a Proxy-ID mismatch. Notifications ‘NO-PROPOSAL-CHOSEN’ 
and ‘RESPONDER-LIFETIME’ may be sent either during Phase 1 or Phase 2. The 
specifics will be found in the SPI and Data fields of the Notification Payload. In the case 
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of attempting to decrypt a MM message 5 with an incorrect PSK, ‘PAYLOAD-
MALFORMED’ was generated, since the contents could not be read. Notifications of 
type ‘INVALID-COOKIE’ appeared only during IKE Phase 1, when ASA received MM 
message 4 without recognizing the initiator and responder cookies (SPIs), since it had 
just a while ago deleted the association entry. 
 
Since these are messages specified in the protocol standards they are used by both 
ASA and PA. However, during the testing it became obvious that PA does not support 
the ‘INVALID-COOKIE’, ‘PAYLOAD-MALFORMED’ or ‘INVALID-ID-INFORMATION’ 
notification types in the scenarios covered in this study. Thus, we may conclude that 
ASA implements a wider range of  ISAKMP notification messages, thus making trou-
bleshooting easier for the peer. 
 
7 Device Interoperability and Limitations 
 
IPsec, being by design a modular protocol framework, was easily implemented on and 
supported by both PA-200 and ASA 5505. The terminology differed slightly between 
the vendors such as ‘crypto map’ or transform-set’. The appendices will serve as refer-
ences for the differences between CLI commands, but going through them is outside of 
this study. 
 
Among the configuration steps, the most obvious variation between the two was ASA’s 
requirement for a policy-based VPN arrangement. Another noteworthy difference was 
support for DH groups; this software version of IOS for ASA would not support beyond 
group 5, while PA could go for the more secure group 14. The focus on IKEv1 over 
IKEv2 was also solidified by the fact that this PAN-OS version did not have IKEv2 sup-
port yet implemented. Thus, in this study it is no overstatement to consider software 
versions playing at least as big a role as the vendor difference. 
 
With regard to troubleshooting means, both devices have features for packet capture, 
system logging, CLI debugging and status observations. ASA’s debugging capabilities 
appear cleaner and less cryptic compared to PA which tends to leave the majority of 
the message contents in hexadecimal form, though PA provides more insight on the 
operations taking place in the background such as hashing. Then again, Cisco and 
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Cisco’s ASA have more documentation available than Palo Alto, so this study may not 
have covered the most optimal troubleshooting tools – especially for PA-200. 
 
8 Conclusion 
 
The goal of this thesis was to configure and systematically troubleshoot an IPsec Site-
to-Site VPN. The results were to be used to aid future troubleshooting and to compare 
the devices’ VPN troubleshooting capabilities. 
 
The initial device setup for the practical part of the study went without notable issues. 
The Configuration stage was based on various other studies which came with a les-
sons learned input. As a result the configuring was complete as soon as the policy-
based VPN constraint on ASA’s end was addressed. 
 
VPN Experimenting and Troubleshooting section attempted to cover as many different 
cases and scenarios as possible, but still ended up limiting the number of subjects 
quite considerably such as omitting Transport mode or other authentication methods. 
As more scenarios were covered my desire for a deeper level of understanding grew. 
This is evident from the fact that ASA’s debugging was done at level 127 in the begin-
ning and at 254 from halfway through until the end. My personal understanding by the 
end of experimenting was quite satisfactory, which alone made the project worthwhile. 
 
As for lessons learned: with regard to information gathering, regardless of the vendor, 
the receiver will have a clearer understanding of the underlying issue. The initiator will 
hopefully have means to receive and decipher any notification messages sent by the 
receiver to understand why the negotiations are not progressing as they should. In this 
study, due to ASA 5505’s wider support for ISAKMP notifications, PA-200 had access 
to considerably more information.   
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Appendix 1: ASA 5505 Running Configuration 
 
ASA-5505# show running-config  
: Saved 
:  
: Serial Number: JMX16304066 
: Hardware:   ASA5505, 512 MB RAM, CPU Geode 500 MHz 
: 
ASA Version 9.2(4)  
! 
hostname ASA-5505 
enable password uklS0vKXrJp/cCYm encrypted 
xlate per-session deny tcp any4 any4 
xlate per-session deny tcp any4 any6 
xlate per-session deny tcp any6 any4 
xlate per-session deny tcp any6 any6 
xlate per-session deny udp any4 any4 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any4 any6 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any6 any4 eq domain 
xlate per-session deny udp any6 any6 eq domain 
names 
! 
interface Ethernet0/0 
 switchport access vlan 10 
! 
interface Ethernet0/1 
 switchport access vlan 20 
! 
interface Ethernet0/2 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/3 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/4 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/5 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/6 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Ethernet0/7 
 shutdown 
! 
interface Vlan1 
 no nameif 
 no security-level 
 no ip address 
! 
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interface Vlan10 
 nameif trust 
 security-level 100 
 ip address 10.0.2.254 255.255.255.0  
! 
interface Vlan20 
 nameif untrust 
 security-level 0 
 ip address 172.16.2.1 255.255.255.252  
! 
ftp mode passive 
clock timezone GMT 0 
object network 172.16.2.2 
 host 172.16.2.2 
 description Default Gateway 
object network 10.0.1.0_24 
 subnet 10.0.1.0 255.255.255.0 
 description PA_LAN 
object network 10.0.2.0_24 
 subnet 10.0.2.0 255.255.255.0 
 description ASA_LAN 
access-list PROXY-ID-ACL extended permit ip object 10.0.2.0_24 object 10.0.1.0_24  
access-list FALSE-ACL extended permit ip any any  
pager lines 100 
logging enable 
logging asdm informational 
mtu trust 1500 
mtu untrust 1500 
icmp unreachable rate-limit 1 burst-size 1 
no asdm history enable 
arp timeout 14400 
no arp permit-nonconnected 
nat (trust,untrust) source static 10.0.2.0_24 10.0.2.0_24 destination static 10.0.1.0_24 
10.0.1.0_24 no-proxy-arp route-lookup 
! 
nat (trust,untrust) after-auto source dynamic any interface 
route untrust 0.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 172.16.2.2 1 
timeout xlate 3:00:00 
timeout pat-xlate 0:00:30 
timeout conn 1:00:00 half-closed 0:10:00 udp 0:02:00 icmp 0:00:02 
timeout sunrpc 0:10:00 h323 0:05:00 h225 1:00:00 mgcp 0:05:00 mgcp-pat 0:05:00 
timeout sip 0:30:00 sip_media 0:02:00 sip-invite 0:03:00 sip-disconnect 0:02:00 
timeout sip-provisional-media 0:02:00 uauth 0:05:00 absolute 
timeout tcp-proxy-reassembly 0:01:00 
timeout floating-conn 0:00:00 
dynamic-access-policy-record DfltAccessPolicy 
user-identity default-domain LOCAL 
http server enable 
http 10.0.2.1 255.255.255.255 trust 
no snmp-server location 
no snmp-server contact 
crypto ipsec ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES1-SHA esp-aes esp-sha-hmac  
crypto ipsec security-association pmtu-aging infinite 
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crypto map VPN_MAP 1 match address PROXY-ID-ACL 
 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set peer 172.16.1.1  
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set ikev1 transform-set ESP-AES1-SHA 
crypto map VPN_MAP 1 set security-association lifetime seconds 3600 
crypto map VPN_MAP interface untrust 
crypto ca trustpool policy 
crypto ikev1 enable untrust 
crypto ikev1 am-disable 
crypto ikev1 policy 10 
 authentication pre-share 
 encryption aes 
 hash sha 
 group 5 
 lifetime 28800 
telnet timeout 5 
ssh stricthostkeycheck 
ssh timeout 5 
ssh key-exchange group dh-group1-sha1 
console timeout 0 
 
threat-detection basic-threat 
threat-detection statistics access-list 
no threat-detection statistics tcp-intercept 
tunnel-group 172.16.1.1 type ipsec-l2l 
tunnel-group 172.16.1.1 ipsec-attributes 
 ikev1 pre-shared-key ***** 
! 
class-map inspection_default 
 match default-inspection-traffic 
! 
! 
policy-map type inspect dns preset_dns_map 
 parameters 
  message-length maximum client auto 
  message-length maximum 512 
policy-map global_policy 
 class inspection_default 
  inspect dns preset_dns_map  
  inspect ftp  
  inspect h323 h225  
  inspect h323 ras  
  inspect ip-options  
  inspect netbios  
  inspect rsh  
  inspect rtsp  
  inspect skinny   
  inspect esmtp  
  inspect sqlnet  
  inspect sunrpc  
  inspect tftp  
  inspect sip   
  inspect xdmcp  
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! 
service-policy global_policy global 
prompt hostname context  
no call-home reporting anonymous 
call-home 
 profile CiscoTAC-1 
  no active 
  destination address http 
https://tools.cisco.com/its/service/oddce/services/DDCEService 
  destination address email callhome@cisco.com 
  destination transport-method http 
  subscribe-to-alert-group diagnostic 
  subscribe-to-alert-group environment 
  subscribe-to-alert-group inventory periodic monthly 
  subscribe-to-alert-group configuration periodic monthly 
  subscribe-to-alert-group telemetry periodic daily 
Cryptochecksum:b6c701a6071a2091643304f06c8e6fe6 
: end. 
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Appendix 2: PA-200 Configuration File 
 
admin@PA-200> set cli config-output-format set 
admin@PA-200> configure  
Entering configuration mode 
[edit]                                                                           
admin@PA-200# show  
set deviceconfig system ip-address 192.168.1.1 
set deviceconfig system netmask 255.255.255.0 
set deviceconfig system update-server updates.paloaltonetworks.com 
set deviceconfig system update-schedule threats recurring weekly day-of-week 
wednesday 
set deviceconfig system update-schedule threats recurring weekly at 01:02 
set deviceconfig system update-schedule threats recurring weekly action download-
only 
set deviceconfig system timezone US/Pacific 
set deviceconfig system service disable-telnet yes 
set deviceconfig system service disable-http yes 
set deviceconfig system hostname PA-200 
set deviceconfig system route service  
set deviceconfig setting config rematch yes 
set deviceconfig setting management hostname-type-in-syslog FQDN 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 neighbor-discovery router-
advertisement enable no 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 adver-
tise enable no 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 adver-
tise valid-lifetime 2592000 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 adver-
tise preferred-lifetime 604800 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 adver-
tise onlink-flag yes 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 adver-
tise auto-config-flag yes 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 address fd00:1:1::254/64 enable-
on-interface yes 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ipv6 enabled yes 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 ip 10.0.1.254/24  
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/1 layer3 interface-management-profile MGMT 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/2 layer3 ipv6 neighbor-discovery router-
advertisement enable no 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/2 layer3 ip 172.16.1.1/30  
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/2 layer3 interface-management-profile PING 
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/3  
set network interface ethernet ethernet1/4  
set network interface loopback units  
set network interface vlan units  
set network interface tunnel units tunnel.1 comment Tunnel_to_ASA 
set network interface tunnel units tunnel.1 ipv6 enabled yes 
set network vlan  
set network virtual-wire  
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set network profiles monitor-profile default interval 3 
set network profiles monitor-profile default threshold 5 
set network profiles monitor-profile default action wait-recover 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT https yes 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT ssh yes 
set network profiles interface-management-profile MGMT ping yes 
set network profiles interface-management-profile PING ping yes 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles default encryption [ aes128 3des ] 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles default hash sha1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles default dh-group group2 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles default lifetime hours 8 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles IKE_P1_ASA hash sha1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles IKE_P1_ASA dh-group group5 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles IKE_P1_ASA encryption aes128 
set network ike crypto-profiles ike-crypto-profiles IKE_P1_ASA lifetime hours 8 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles default esp encryption [ aes128 
3des ] 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles default esp authentication sha1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles default dh-group group2 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles default lifetime hours 1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles IPSec_P2_ASA lifetime hours 1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles IPSec_P2_ASA dh-group no-pfs 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles IPSec_P2_ASA esp authentication 
sha1 
set network ike crypto-profiles ipsec-crypto-profiles IPSec_P2_ASA esp encryption 
aes128 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol ikev1 dpd enable yes 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol ikev1 dpd interval 10 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol ikev1 dpd retry 2 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol ikev1 ike-crypto-profile IKE_P1_ASA 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol ikev1 exchange-mode main 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA local-address ip 172.16.1.1/30 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA local-address interface ethernet1/2 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA authentication pre-shared-key key -
AQ==sr/IwvWjbANysxvwl7+9z7N/fs0=Sc7KRgDWgT68mpaktWdlJg== 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol-common nat-traversal enable yes 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA protocol-common fragmentation enable no 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA peer-address ip 172.16.3.2 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA peer-id id 172.16.2.1 
set network ike gateway VPN_Peer_ASA peer-id type ipaddr 
set network qos profile default class class1 priority real-time 
set network qos profile default class class2 priority high 
set network qos profile default class class3 priority high 
set network qos profile default class class4 priority medium 
set network qos profile default class class5 priority medium 
set network qos profile default class class6 priority low 
set network qos profile default class class7 priority low 
set network qos profile default class class8 priority low 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp enable no 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default cutoff 1.25 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default reuse 0.5 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default max-hold-time 
900 
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set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default decay-half-life-
reachable 300 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default decay-half-life-
unreachable 900 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp dampening-profile default enable yes 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp routing-options graceful-restart enable 
yes 
set network virtual-router default protocol bgp routing-options as-format 2-byte 
set network virtual-router default interface [ ethernet1/1 ethernet1/2 tunnel.1 ] 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route ASA_LAN interface tun-
nel.1 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route ASA_LAN metric 10 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route ASA_LAN destination 
10.0.2.0/24 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route Default_Route nexthop ip-
address 172.16.1.2 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route Default_Route interface 
ethernet1/2 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route Default_Route metric 10 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ip static-route Default_Route destination 
0.0.0.0/0 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ipv6 static-route ASA_LAN_IPv6 inter-
face tunnel.1 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ipv6 static-route ASA_LAN_IPv6 metric 
10 
set network virtual-router default routing-table ipv6 static-route ASA_LAN_IPv6 destina-
tion fd00:2:2::/64 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA auto-key ike-gateway VPN_Peer_ASA  
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA auto-key ipsec-crypto-profile IPSec_P2_ASA 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA auto-key proxy-id Policy-based_ASA protocol 
any  
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA auto-key proxy-id Policy-based_ASA local 
10.0.1.0/24 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA auto-key proxy-id Policy-based_ASA remote 
10.0.2.0/24 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA tunnel-monitor enable no 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA tunnel-monitor destination-ip 10.0.2.254 
set network tunnel ipsec Tunnel_to_ASA tunnel-interface tunnel.1 
set shared application  
set shared application-group  
set shared service  
set shared service-group  
set shared botnet configuration http dynamic-dns enabled yes 
set shared botnet configuration http dynamic-dns threshold 5 
set shared botnet configuration http malware-sites enabled yes 
set shared botnet configuration http malware-sites threshold 5 
set shared botnet configuration http recent-domains enabled yes 
set shared botnet configuration http recent-domains threshold 5 
set shared botnet configuration http ip-domains enabled yes 
set shared botnet configuration http ip-domains threshold 10 
set shared botnet configuration http executables-from-unknown-sites enabled yes 
set shared botnet configuration http executables-from-unknown-sites threshold 5 
set shared botnet configuration other-applications irc yes 
Appendix 2 
4 (5) 
 
 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-tcp destinations-per-
hour 10 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-tcp sessions-per-hour 
10 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-tcp session-length 
maximum-bytes 100 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-tcp session-length min-
imum-bytes 50 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-udp destinations-per-
hour 10 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-udp sessions-per-hour 
10 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-udp session-length 
maximum-bytes 100 
set shared botnet configuration unknown-applications unknown-udp session-length 
minimum-bytes 50 
set shared botnet report topn 100 
set shared botnet report scheduled yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET from trust 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET to untrust 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET source any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET destination any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET service any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET application any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET action allow 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET log-end yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET source-user any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET category any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_INET hip-profiles any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN to vpn 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN from trust 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN source 10.0.1.0/24 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN destination 10.0.2.0/24 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN source-user any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN category any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN application any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN service any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN hip-profiles any 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN action allow 
set rulebase security rules allow_LAN_to_VPN log-end yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN to trust 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN from vpn 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN source 10.0.2.0/24 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN destination 10.0.1.0/24 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN source-user any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN category any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN application any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN service any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN hip-profiles any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN action allow 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_to_LAN log-end yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec to untrust 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec from untrust 
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set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec source [ 172.16.1.1 172.16.2.1 
172.16.3.2_NAT-T ] 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec destination [ 172.16.1.1 172.16.2.1 
172.16.3.2_NAT-T ] 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec source-user any 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec category any 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec application [ ciscovpn icmp ike ip-
sec-esp ipsec-esp-udp ] 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec service any 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec hip-profiles any 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec action allow 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec rule-type universal 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec log-start yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_ICMP_IKE_IPSec log-end yes 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP to untrust 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP from vpn 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP source 172.16.1.1 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP destination [ 172.16.2.1 172.16.3.2_NAT-T 
] 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP source-user any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP category any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP application [ ipsec-esp ipsec-esp-udp ] 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP service any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP hip-profiles any 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP action allow 
set rulebase security rules allow_VPN_ESP log-start yes 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET to untrust 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET from trust 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET source 10.0.1.0/24 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET destination any 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET service any 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET to-interface ethernet1/2 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET nat-type ipv4 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET source-translation dynamic-ip-and-port 
interface-address ip 172.16.1.1/30 
set rulebase nat rules SNAT_LAN_to_INET source-translation dynamic-ip-and-port 
interface-address interface ethernet1/2 
set application-group  
set application  
set schedule  
set address 172.16.1.1 ip-netmask 172.16.1.1/32 
set address 172.16.2.1 ip-netmask 172.16.2.1/32 
set address 172.16.3.2_NAT-T ip-netmask 172.16.3.2/32 
set service-group  
set service  
set zone trust network layer3 ethernet1/1 
set zone untrust network layer3 ethernet1/2 
set zone vpn network layer3 tunnel.1 
set import network interface [ ethernet1/1 ethernet1/2 tunnel.1 ] 
set mgt-config users admin phash $1$agvfpfbm$WsgVKqkB0JEpBoeDyG1A4/ 
set mgt-config users admin permissions role-based superuser yes 
